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THE UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT
AND THE PARENTAL KIDNAPPING PREVENTION
ACT: DUAL RESPONSE TO INTERSTATE CHILD
CUSTODY PROBLEMS
The full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution1 insures that decisions courts render in one state receive equal recognition
in the courts of other states.2 The United States Supreme Court has
upheld application of the full faith and credit clause in virtually every
area of the law.' The Court, however, has been reluctant to extend
' Article four of the United States Constitution provides: "Full Faith and Credit shall
be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and Judicial Proceedings of every other
State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts,
Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
Congress has implemented the full faith and credit clause by statute. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1976).
2 The constitutional policies that the full faith and credit clause serves to advance are
manifold. The United State Supreme Court has stated that full faith and credit promotes national unity by requiring interstate recognition of judicial decrees. See Sherrer v. Sherrer,
334 U.S. 343, 355 (1948). The emphasis of the full faith and credit clause on national unification buttresses principles of federalism that the Constitution supports. See Reese &
Johnson, The Scope of Full Faith and Credit to Judgments, 49 COLU9I. L. REV. 153, 178
(1949) [hereinafter cited as Reese & Johnson]. The full faith and credit clause imposes no
substantive law on the states, but rather defers to states to develop their own policies,
which the clause insures other states will respect. Id. Each state remains free to exercise
discretion over its own courts, yet must recognize decrees of sister states. Johnson v.
Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581, 585 (1951). Thus, full faith and credit precludes 'dissatisfied
litigants from exploiting the federal structure of the government by pursuing their causes
of action in other states after one state already has resolved the issues. Kovacs v. Brewer,
356 U.S. 604, 611 (1958). By mandating recognition of existing decrees, the full faith and
credit clause dissuades losing parties from forum shopping. Id. Overall, full faith and credit
has promoted stability and continuity in the law. Id. See generally Reese & Johnson, supra
(discussion of scope and meaning of full faith and credit).
See, e.g., Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 109 (1963) (Nebraska quiet title decision entitled to full faith and credit in Missouri); First Nat'l Bank v. United Air Lines, 342 U.S. 396,
398 (1951) (Illinois required to recognize Utah wrongful death statute); John Hancock Ins.
Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178, 183 (1936) (state statutory provision in New York contract
merited full faith and credit in Georgia); see generally Reese, Full Faith and Credit to
ForeignEquity Decrees, 42 IowA L. REV. 183, 187 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Reese].
The Supreme Court generally has not been as consistent in applying full faith and
credit to the area of family law as it has been in construing the clause in other areas of the
law. Reese, supra, at 187-88. The Court has not addressed the subject squarely in the context of adoption decrees. The only decision that mentions interstate recognition of adoptions is Hood v. McGehee, 237 U.S. 611, 615 (1915). Although the Court implied that full faith
and credit extends to adoptions, the Court did not hold so expressly. Id. In Hood, the Court
upheld a state's right to allow only children adopted within its borders to inherit land, while
denying similar recognition to foreign adoptees. Id. The Court in Hood indicated that while
full faith and credit may apply to the status of adoption, the clause does not extend
necessarily to the rights incident to adoption, which local law governs. Id. One commentator
has suggested that because the discrimination inherent in the distinction between in-
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similar application of the clause to child custody decrees.'
Without guidance from the Supreme Court, states have differed
widely in their approaches to interstate custody recognition, and many
state courts have been unwilling to defer to their sister states' custody
decrees.5 State courts have issued conflicting custody decrees, causing
jurisdictional competition among the states over custody disputes.' The
disparity in state custody laws has affected adversely the families involved in several ways. Until recently, a child of divorcing parents has
faced the prospect of an agonizing series of contests over his custody.'
The inability of custodial parents to enforce custody decrees in uncooperative states has encouraged non-custodial parents to refuse to
return their children after agreed visitation periods The availability of
states willing to ignore foreign custody decrees has provided refuge for
parental kidnappers who seize their children in violation of prior court
orders.' The ones who suffer most from the increased litigation resulting
trastate and interstate adoptions may no longer be constitutionally acceptable, Hood v.
McGehee may be obsolete. Reese, supra, at 194.
The Supreme Court generally has upheld the application of full faith and credit to
divorce decrees, beginning with Williams v. North Carolina,317 U.S. 287 (1942) (Willams 1).
The Court has indicated that policies of national unity and certainty for marital status demand full faith and credit protection of divorce decrees. Id. at 301. The Court, however, has
upheld a refusal of full faith and credt in a divorce case in which the state court lacked personal jurisdiction over one spouse, and in which the plaintiff spouse was not truly a
"domiciliary" of the forum state. See Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 356 (1948); Williams
v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 239 (1945) (Williams II).
' The United States Supreme Court has considered whether child custody decrees are
entitled to full faith and credit on four occasions. See Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187 (1962);
Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604 (1958); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953); New York ex
rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947). On each occasion, the Court declined to uphold
full faith and credit for child custody decrees. See text accompanying notes 18-32 infra. In
Webb v. Webb, the Supreme Court avoided the issue whether child custody decrees are entitled to full faith and credit. 451 U.S. 493, 495 (1981). Because neither party raised the constitutional question at the state trial, the Court held that the litigants could not contest the
full faith and credit issue on appeal. Id. at 501-02.
See note 33 infra.
One state court may award the mother custody in a divorce proceeding while
another state grants custody to the father. Compare Stout v. Pate, 120 Cal. App. 2d 699,
,__
261 P.2d 788, 790 (1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 968 (1954) (ignoring Georgia's exercise
of custody jurisdiction and upholding trial court custody modification on basis of children's
presence in California) with Stout v. Pate, 209 Ga. 786, -,
75 S.E.2d 748, 748 (1953) (letting stand divorce court custody modification based on changed circumstance of children's
removal to California), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 968 (1954). See Commissioners' Prefatory
Note, UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT, reprinted in 9 UNIF. LAWS ANNOT. 113,
113-14 (West 1979) [hereinafter cited as Commissioners' Note].
7 See text accompanying notes 33-40 infra.
' Bodenheimer, Progress Under the Uniform Child Custody JurisdictionAct and Remaining Problems: Punitive Decrees, Joint Custody, and Excessive Modifications, 65
CALIF. L. REv. 978, 979 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Bodenheimer].
I Id. Although no precise figures are available, estimates of the number of annual
parental kidnappings range from 25,000 to 100,000. See ParentalKidnapping Prevention
Act of 1979: Joint Hearings on S. 105 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the
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from state custody law disparity are the children whose home lives are
at stake. Not only do custody contests exacerbate already strained family relations, but the disputes also subject the children involved to emotional and psychological stress, potentially damaging to proper development. 0
In a concerted effort to alleviate interstate custody problems, most
states1 ' now have adopted the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
(UCCJA), 2 which requires recognition of foreign custody decress conforming to the statute's jurisdictional provisions."3 To close the remaining
gaps in interstate custody recognition, Congress passed the Parental
Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980 (PKPA),14 which extends full faith
and credit to custody decrees in all states."5 The combined federal and
state effort promises to curtail significantly interstate custody problems. Several possible impediments, however, threaten to hamper the
effectiveness of the two statutes." How courts apply the acts ultimately
will determine whether the legislation can succeed in reducing interstate custody disputes.
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Child and Human Development of
the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1980) (statement
of Senator Malcolm Wallop) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
10 The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has noted that
one need not have formal training in the behavioral sciences to know that a child requires a
secure and stable home environment as well as continuity of affection. Commissioners'
Note, supra note 6, at 112. For an explanation of how the psychological importance of proper
child development relates to this area of the law, see generally A. WATSON, PSYCHIATRY FOR
LAWYERS 196-206 (1978) (stability and continuity represent child's best interest); 1963 PROCEEDINGS, SECTION OF FAMILY LAW, A.B.A. in READINGS IN LAW AND PSYCHIATRY 316-22 (R.
Allen, E. Feuster & J. Rubin eds. 1968) (emotional impact of custody decrees on child
development); Plant, The Psychiatrist Views Childrenof Divorced Parents, 10 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 807, 812-14 (1944) (children's need for security and continuity of affection).
'1 Although initial approval was slow, forty-six states now have enacted the Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), primarily in the last three years. S. KATZ, CHILD
SNATCHING: THE LEGAL RESPONSE TO THE ABDUCTION OF CHILDREN 15 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as KATZ]. Only Massachusetts, Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas, and the District of
Columbia have not adopted the UCCJA. Id. Massachusetts, however, has adopted the basic
elements of the UCCJA by judicial fiat. Murphy v. Murphy, 404 N.E.2d 69, 72-74 (Mass.
1980) (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court applied UCCJA principles in defining proper
exercises of custody jurisdiction).
12 UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT, reprinted in 9 UNIF. LAVS ANNOT. 116
(West 1979); see text accompanying notes 50-62 infra. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved the UCCJA at its annual meeting in July 1968.

See Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child Custody JurisdictionAct: A Legislative Remedy for
Children Caught in the Conflict of Laws, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1207, 1207 n.1 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as Legislative Remedy].
Is UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT § 13, reprinted in 9 UNIF. LAWS ANNOT.
112, (West 1979).
"' Pub. L. No. 96-611, 94 Stat. 3568 (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1207, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A,
42 U.S.C.A. §§ 654, 663 (1980)); see text accompanying notes 70-77 infra.
Is 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(a) (1980).
Is

See text accompanying notes 89-105 infra.
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Commentators credit the Supreme Court's failure to extend full
faith and credit to child custody decrees as the principal source of interstate custody problems." The Supreme Court first considered
whether child custody rulings are entitled to full faith and credit in New
York ex reL Halvey v. Halvey. 8 Recognizing that child custody decrees
are not ordinarily final but remain subject to trial court modification, the
Halvey Court refused to demand that New York extend full faith and
credit to a Florida custody decision.19 The Court relied on Florida law
permitting modification of initial custody on the basis of facts not considered in the original trial to hold that New York likewise could alter
the Florida decree."0 The Court was unwilling to require New York to
uphold the Florida ruling because new evidence became available that
the Florida court did not evaluate." The Court's reasoning supports an
exception to the general full faith and credit requirement when child
custody decrees are subject to modification."
In May v. Anderson," the Supreme Court again declined to hold that
the full faith and credit clause requires interstate recognition of custody
decrees. While an Ohio court was willing to recognize a Wisconsin
custody decree, the United States Supreme Court reversed because the
Wisconsin court lacked personal jurisdiction over the mother. The
Supreme Court refused to require that Ohio grant full faith and credit to
" See, e.g., Legislative Remedy, supra note 12, at 1210-15; Hazard, May v. Anderson:
Preamble to Family Law Chaos, 45 VA. L. REV. 379, 390-95 (1959); Ratner, Child Custody in
a FederalSystem, 62 MIon. L. REV. 795, 798-807 (1964); Note, Ford v. Ford: Full Faith and
Credit to Child Custody Decrees, 73 YALE L.J. 134, 136-42 (1963).
" 330 U.S. 610 (1947). In Halvey, the day before the child's mother obtained a divorce
and custody award in Florida, the father took the child without the mother's permission to
New York. Id at 611-12. The mother then sought a habeas corpus decree from a New York
court to restore to her the permanent custody of the child consistent with the Florida
decree. Id. at 612. Instead, the New York court refused to recognize the Florida proceeding
and issued its own custody decision, modifying the original decree by granting the father
specific visitation rights. Id.
" Id. at 613. In Halvey, Florida reserved the right to modify the custody decree later
in light of changed circumstances. Id. The Supreme Court ruled that New York, likewise,
could reexamine the circumstances surrounding the child's custody. Id. at 614.
Id. at 612.
21 Id. at 613-14.
Id. at 614.
345 U.S. 528 (1953). In May, after the parents experienced marital problems in
Wisconsin, they decided the mother and children should visit Ohio while the mother and
father considered their future plans. Id. at 530. When the mother refused to return, the
father sought a Wisconsin ex parte divorce and custody of the children. Id. Although the
mother received service of process in Ohio, she failed to appear at the Wisconsin hearing.
Id. at 531. Wisconsin allows out-of-state service in divorce actions, but such service is not
available for child custody proceedings. Id. The father used the custody decree to obtain
control of the children. Id. Later, when the children were visiting their mother, she refused
to allow them to return to Wisconsin. Id- at 532. The father then obtained a writ of habeas
corpus in Ohio to secure release of the children in accordance with the Wisconsin decree. Id.
2 Id. at 534.
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the Wisconsin decree because the mother was not domiciled, resident, or
present in Wisconsin when the Wisconsin court decided the case.2
Because the Court decided May on the narrower personal jurisdiction
issue, the decision offers little insight into the Court's reasons for its
denial of full faith and credit to custody rulings in other csaes.
The next Supreme Court decision considering the effect of one
state's child.custody decree in its sister states was Kovacs v. Brewer.28
The Kovacs Court recognized another means by which states can escape
upholding sister state's decrees. The Court endorsed the "change of circumstances" rule, which states may employ to avoid full faith and credit
when a child's home environment has alteredY In endorsing the change
of circumstances rule, the Court relied on the lack of finality of decisions
in which changed circumstances require modification of the initial
custody decree. 8
In Ford v. Ford,29 the Supreme Court again declined to hold that
child custody decrees merit full faith and credit. The Supreme Court
refused to require South Carolina to recognize a Virginia custody decree
by which the trial court effectuated the parties' private settlement
agreement. 0 The Court did not consider the Virginia decree binding
because the trial court had not undertaken its own custody investigation." The Court emphasized the public's strong interest in custody
,5Id. One member of the Supreme Court in May noted that the Court's decision permits state courts to uphold custody decrees of sister states on the basis of comity, which
allows discretionary rather than mandatory recognition of foreign decrees. Id. at 535.
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
N 356 U.S. 604 (1958). In Kovacs, a New York divorce court granted custody to the
child's paternal grandfather. Id. at 604-05. After the grandfather returned home with the
child to North Carolina, the mother in New York succeeded in modifying the New York
divorce decree to give her custody. Id. at 605. The mother then brought a habeas corpus
proceeding in North Carolina to enforce the New York custody award. Id. The North
Carolina court ignored the mother's pleas of changed circumstances justifying the child's
transfer and found the grandfather sufficiently fit to retain custody of the child. Id. at 606.
' Id. at 608. The "change of circumstances" rule simply means that alteration in a
child's home environment can provide a basis for realignment of custody. See Note, Child
Custody Decree-InterstateRecognition, 49 IowA L. REV.1178, 1187-91 (1964).
1 Id. Although the Kovacs Court accepted the change of circumstances rule, the
record would not support a finding of changed circumstances and the Court remanded the
case. Id.
371 U.S. 187 (1962). In Ford, after litigation over the custody of their children had
begun, the parents settled their dispute privately, agreeing to divided custody of the
children. Id at 188. A Virginia court issued an order dismissing the case and acknowledged
that the parties had reached accord. Id. Later, when the children were visiting their mother
in South Carolina, she filed suit to obtain custody. Id. The father tried to prevent alteration
of the Virginia agreement by pleading that the Virginia order was entitled to full faith and
credit. Id. at 189. The trial court rejected the father's contention and awarded the mother
more generous custody rights. Id. The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the trial
court and recognized the Virginia decree. Id. at 190.
Id. at 194.
31

Id
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dispute resolution and refused to consider the parties' accord as dispositive, even though the Virginia court had approved the agreement.2
The Supreme Court's failure to state a clear position on the application of full faith and credit to child custody decrees has promoted uncertainty in the states' interpretation of the clause.' By creating exceptions
to full faith and credit, the Court in effect has encouraged local jurisdictions to give less credence to the custody rulings of their sister states.'
In so holding, the Court grants the disgruntled loser in child custody
proceedings a chance to seek judicial modification of custody in the
courts of sister states.3" In view of the Court's position, the losing parent
in a child custody case has little incentive not to abduct his children and
search for a more favorable forum. Even if a parent elects not to take
the drastic step of snatching his children from their court-designated
home, the Court's position fails to dissuade the losing parent in a custody
case from exploiting visitation periods in an attempt to regain custody in
a sister state.
The most destructive aspect of the Supreme Court's failure to
resolve the constitutional dispute over the extraterritorial effect of
custody decrees is its impact on the stability and continuity of the
displaced child's home life. s A child emotionally torn by his parents'
estrangement may suffer further trauma if a custody action succeeds in
uprooting him and transplanting him in a new environment. 9 Witnessing

Id. at 192.
While most states have recognized the applicability of full faith and credit to child
custody, many state courts have found ways of avoiding deference to their sister states'
custody decisions. See, e.g., DeHart v. Layman, 536 P.2d 789, 792 (Alaska 1975) (best interest of child may require relitigation); Nehra v. Uhlar, 168 N.J. Super. 187, 194, 402 A.2d
264, 268 (1979) (mere passage of time justifies reexamination); Levine v. Tommasi, 54 A.D.2d
974, 975, 389 N.Y.S.2d 114, 115-16 (1976) (inadequate trial court inquiry into child's welfare
deserves reconsideration). Rather than apply full faith and credit, still other state courts rely
on the vaguer doctrine of comity, which allows discretionary rather than mandatory
recognition of foreign decrees. See, e.g., Fawkes v. Fawkes, 360 So.2d 719, 720 (Ala. Civ.
App.), cert. denied, 360 So.2d 721 (Ala. 1978) (refusing to offer comity to sister state decree);
Lindsey v. Lindsey, 200 So.2d 643, 643-44 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (extending comity
recognition to foreign-state decree); Metz v. Morley, 29 A.D.2d 462, 464-65, 289 N.Y.S.2d
364, 367 (1968) (granting comity in absence of full faith and credit). The concept of comity is
that courts of one state should uphold decrees of other states, not as a matter of right, but
out of deference and mutual respect. Nowell v. Nowell, 408 S.W.2d 550, 553 (Tex. Civ. App.
1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 847 (1967). Without the constitutional mandate that undergirds
full faith and credit, comity has proven to be a vague and inconsistent guideline for interstate recognition of custody decrees. See KATZ, supra note 11, at 69.
3' Bodenheimer, supra note 8, at 981.
Id. at 982.
Note, Preventionof Child Stealing: The Need for a NationalPolicy, 11 LOYOLA L. A.
L. REv. 829, 829 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Child Stealing].
Id- at 835.
H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 326 (1968).

~'Id.
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a bitter divorce is harmful enough to a child. A child's exposure to further dispute in a custody case is cause for damaging guilt and anguish
for many children. 0
The strong public policy reasons for maintaining custody decrees
free from modification" raise the question why the Supreme Court has
elected not to uphold full faith and credit in this area of the law. One explanation is that when the Court decided the four cases" involving interstate custody recognition, the justices generally believed that allowing periodic examination and realignment of a child's home served the
best interest of the child." Only recently has the gap in communications
between the behavioral sciences and the law closed sufficiently to alert
legal commentators to the fact that stability and security are the most
essential elements in a child's proper development." Legal scholars now
know that repeated shifting of a child's home may be more harmful to a
child's emotional well-being than enduring a home life under less than
optimal conditions.4" The Supreme Court's failure definitively to recognize full faith and credit for custody decrees probably reflects more a
misconception of how best to serve the interests of children than a lack
6
of sensitivity by the Court."
Regardless of the reason for the Court's
denial of full faith and credit protection for custody decrees, the effect of
the Court's decisions has been to encourage forum shopping,47 promote
interstate jurisdictional competition,48 and disrupt the home life of countless children.49
In order to alleviate interstate custody problems, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved the Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act in 1968.1o The UCCJA attempts to mini-

"

Id.
See text accompanying notes 8-10 supra.

42

See note 4 supra.

40

See Commissioners'Note,supra note 6, at 113.'
See Legislative Remedy, supra note 12, at 1212.
45 The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has noted that
courts have tended to overemphasize the need for flexibility of custody decrees at the expense of the child's need for stability. Commissioners'Note, supra note 6, at 113. See also
Child Stealing, supra note 36, at 833.
48 One commentator has suggested that deference to Congress may explain the
Supreme Court's reluctance to demand full faith and credit for custody cases. Currie, Full
Faith and Credi Chiefly to Judgments: A Role for Congress, SuP. CT. REv. 89, 110 (1964).
Given the heavy policy considerations involved, the Court may have considered Congress a
more appropriate forum for determining whether to mandate interstate recognition of
custody decrees. Id.
"

4"

See Bodenheimer, supra note 8, at 979.

48 Id.

48Id.
'5 See notes 11-12 supra. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws is an organization of lawyers, judges, and law professors. See 9 UNir. LAWS ANNOT. iiiiv (West 1979). Each state selects members to draft and encourage enactment of laws offering solutions to problems common to all states. Id.
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mize relitigation by vesting custody jurisdiction in the original state
court, which then becomes the "custody court" for a particular case. 1
The UCCJA seeks to reduce interstate jurisdictional competition by
restricting the courts eligible to become the custody court.52 The UCCJA
limits custody jurisdiction to four narrow grounds. A court can exercise
jurisdiction if the state is the child's "home state" under the statute," if
the child and at least one parent have strong ties to the state and sufficient evidence about the child's family life is available," if the child is
present in the state and in danger,55 or if no other state assumes jurisdiction in the case.
After a custody proceeding has commenced in one state, the UCCJA
precludes other states that have adopted the UCCJA from exercising
jurisdiction.5 7 Once the court issues a custody decree, the UCCJA requires that all states operating under provisions of the UCCJA recognize the decision. 8 The UCCJA makes recognition of custody decrees
issued in compliance with its provisions a statutory comity obligation.
Comity derives not from constitutional authority but from the deference
that states extend to the court decrees of sister states." By relying on
the doctrine of comity rather than full faith and credit, the UCCJA
avoids potential conflicts with the Supreme Court position that the Constitution does not require interstate custody recognition. Statutory
The term "custody court" refers to the one court vested with the responsibility of
rendering custody determinations in a particular case. See Note, Stemming the Proliferation of ParentalKidnapping: New York's Adoption of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, 45 BROOKLYN L. REv. 89, 91 n.16 (1978) [hereinafter cited as ParentalKidnapping].
52 See Commissioners' Note, supra note 6, at 114. Once a court has assumed custody
jurisdiction, it retains jurisdiction over the case so long as the court satisfies the jurisdictional prerequisites. See text accompanying notes 102-05 infra.
" The UCCJA prescribes that the prefered custody jurisdiction is the child's home
state. UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT § 3(a)(1), reprinted in 9 UNIF. LAWS ANNOT. 116 (West 1979). The UCCJA defines "home state" as a state in which the child has lived
'

for at least six consecutive months prior to the custody proceedings. Id. § 2(5).
" A state unable to satisfy the home state test may adjudicate custody of a child living
within its borders less than six months provided the parent and child have significant contacts with the state. Id. § 3(a)(2). The court also must have sufficient access to relevant information about the child's family and upbringing. Id.
5 A state may act on an emergency basis to protect a child who is present in the state
and whose custodial parent has abandoned, threatened, abused, or mistreated him. Id §
3(a)(3).
I Should no other state be able or willing to exercise jurisdiction under the other
three provisions of the uniform act, the UCCJA allows a state to assume jurisdiction in
order for the custody case to receive a hearing somewhere. Id. § 3(a)(4).
- Id. § 13.
5 Id.
59Id., see note 33 supra (discussion of comity doctrine).
I Nowell v. Nowell, 408 S.W.2d 550, 553 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966), cerL denied, 389 U.S.
847 (1967).
1 One member of the Supreme Court has indicated that despite the Court's unwillingness to require full faith and credit, states remain free to recognize sister states' custody
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comity adopted on a uniform basis offers much stronger support for interstate custody recognition than the vaguer, discretionary comity concept courts employed prior to the UCCJA.62 Although initial lack of
familiarity with the UCCJA produced questionable interpretations,"3 the
UCCJA should succeed in reducing multiple litigation of custody decrees." The UCCJA also should contribute to the reduction in the
5
number of parental abductions of children.1
Several potential weaknesses threaten to limit the effectiveness of
the UCCJA. The UCCJA's dependence on judicial interpretation may
place too much discretion in the hands of state judges whose treatment
of the statute may differ. 66 Inconsistent judicial application may dilute
the uniformity the UCCJA seeks to promote. In addition, the failure of
even a few states to enact the UCCJA has provided refuge for child abductors to escape the interstate recognition of child custody under the
UCCJA. 7 The first problem should dissipate as state judges become
more familiar with the UCCJA.6 8 The United States Congress acted to
overcome the second UCCJA weakness when it adopted the Parental
Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980 (PKPA),9 closing the remaining gaps
in the extraterritorial effect of custody decrees.
decrees based on comity. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 535 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see KATZ, supra note 11, at 6. The UCCJA, therefore, probably would conform to the
Supreme Court's position. Id.at 75. No court yet has considered a challenge to'the constitutionality of the UCCJA on full faith and credit grounds. Id. Because the uniform act requires
interstate recognition without intruding on the Supreme Court's territory, however, the
UCCJA likely would withstand constitutional challenge. I&
6

See KATZ, supra note 11, at 6.

Bodenheimer, supra note 8, at 985; see, e.g., Nelson v. District Court, 186 Colo. 381,
P.2d 811, 813-14 (1974) (upholding tenuous jurisdictional connection with forum
state); Giddings v. Giddings, 228 N.W.2d 915, 917-18 (N.D. 1975 ) (trial court overlooked
UCCJA notice provisions).
See ParentalKidnapping,supra note 51, at 123.
See Bodenheimer, supra note 8, at 985-87.
I& at 985. Judicial interpretation of UCCJA jurisdictional provisions may become a
critical factor in determining whether the act can survive due process challenge. See text
accompanying notes 89-93 infra.
61 Hearings,supra note 9, at 144 (statement of Russell M. Coombs).
6 Id. As state judges begin to recognize the interrelationship among the states that
the UCCJA promotes, their interpretations of UCCJA provisions should become more consistent.
6 Pub. L. No. 96-611, 94 Stat. 3568 (codified at 18 U.S.C.A § 1073, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A,
42 U.S.C.A. §§ 654, 663 (1980)). In the last week of its second session, the 96th Congress
passed the Wallop Bill, named after its principal author and proponent Senator Malcolm
Wallop, as a rider to the Pneumonococcal Vaccine Medical Coverage Act, which President
Carter signed on December 28, 1980.
The effective date of the new statute is a source of dispute. In In re Ross, which cited
but did not rely on the federal law, the court mentioned that the statute became effective
when President Carter signed the bill on December 28, 1980. 630 P.2d 353, 362 n.20 (Or.
1981). The court in Sher-ner v. Cornelius,however, which also referred to but did not apply
the statute, indicated that Congress drafted the legislation to take effect on July 1, 1981.
278 S.E.2d 349, 351 n.1 (W. Va. 1981). The pneumonococcal vaccine provisions of the statute
-,527
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The PKPA requires state courts to enforce without modification
sister states' custody decrees that conform to the Act." By demanding
interstate recognition of custody decisions, congressional sponsors intended the PKPA to discourage forum shopping, reduce jurisdictional
competition, deter parental kidnapping, and promote stable homes. 7 The
PKPA adopts language the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act employs to define the prerequisites to exercises of custody jurisdiction
recognizable under the statute." State child custody determinations are
consistent with the PKPA and eligible for full faith and credit protection
provided the state court has jurisdiction under its own laws and meets
one of several conditions. For interstate recognition to apply, the state
issuing the decree must have been the home state of the child for the
previous six months." If no state meets the home state jurisdictional
prerequisite, a state may exercise custody jurisdiction when the child is
present in a state with which he and a parent have a significant connecclearly became effective July 1, 1981. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395 note (1980). Congress did not include parental kidnapping in the original bill but added the provisions later by amendment.
126 CONG. REv. S16,506 (daily ed. Dec. 13, 1980). Thus, Congress may not have intended the
effective date provision to apply to the parental kidnapping sections of the statute.
In addition to the full faith and credit provisions, the Act expands the federal Parent
Locator Service of the Department of Health and Human Services. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 654, 663
(1980). The Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA) amends the Social Security Act to
add the function of locating the kidnapping parent and child to the present duty of the
Parent Locator Service to track down absent parents to enforce child support payments. Id.
The federal Parent Locator Services relies on data that the Social Security Administration, the Veterans Administration, the Department of Transportation, the General Services Administration, the Department of Defense, and the Internal Revenue Service supply.
42 U.S.C. § 653 (1976); see Shutter, ParentalKidnapping Prevention Act-Panacea or
Toothless Tiger, 55 FLA. B.J. 479, 480 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Shutter]. The information
that the PKPA provides is available to "authorized persons" as the statute defines. The list
of "authorized persons" does not include the custodial parent. Rather, the parent must apply to the court with jurisdiction, to the state attorney, to a U.S. attorney, or to state or
federal law enforcement agencies to receive information on the whereabouts of the kidnapping parent or child. Shutter, supra, at 480.
The new statute also extends the Fugitive Felon Act to assist states in their felony
prosecutions of parental kidnappers. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1073 (1980). The Fugitive Felon Act offers the resources of the Justice Department to locate and apprehend fugitives from state
justice. 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1976). Upon a showing of probable cause that the fugitive has fled
the state to avoid prosecution, a federal warrant will issue and the Justice Department may
assist in returning the fleeing parent and child to the state. See Shutter, supra, at 480-81.
Absent from the PKPA is a provision originally a part of the measure, making parental kidnapping across state lines a federal crime. Id. at 480. Parental kidnapping is
specifically exempt from federal prosecution under the so-called Lindbergh Act. 18 U.S.C. §
1201(a) (1976).
- 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(a) (1980).
1 See PARENTAL KIDNAPPING PREVENTION ACT, Pub. L. No. 96-611 § 7(c), 94 Stat. 3568

(1980) (legislative purposes).
72 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(c)(2) (1980).
" Id. § 1738A(c)(2)(A). Congress derived the definition of "home state" directly from
the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act. See note 53 supra.
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tion and sufficient evidence about the child's family is available. 4 The
PKPA also recognizes custody decrees based on a state's exercise of
emergency jurisdiction when the child is present in the state and in
danger. 5 Finally, the federal statute requires states to recognize decrees
that a state issues when no other state is willing or able to assume jurisdiction."' Once a state court assumes custody jurisdiction, the state may
continue to exercise jurisdiction over the case so long as the state meets
the jurisdictional prerequisites."Y
One principal reason for federal legislation in the area of custody
recognition was to prevent states not enacting the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act from becoming havens for child abductors. 8 As
long as even a few states chose not to enact the UCCJA, parents would
have continued to have an incentive to seize their children and flee to
non-UCCJA states in search of more favorable custody rulings.79 Passage
of the federal statute alleviates the child snatching problem by requiring
that custody decrees that courts render in one state receive equal
recognition in the courts of the remaining states." The PKPA is likely to
deter potential child snatchers by eliminating the incentive for forum
shopping.
In addition to requiring interstate recognition of custody decrees,
the federal statute will help reduce the effect of state by state deviations
from the UCCJA language. 1 By making enforcement of sister states'
custody decisions a federal obligation, the PKPA makes the federal
judicial system available to promote uniform interpretation of the law.2
Inherent in the federal judiciary is the capacity to encourage statutory
uniformity, which is difficult to achieve through the myriad of state
courts.
The full faith and credit clause of the Constitution specifically empowers Congress to prescribe the effect state judicial decisions will have
7

28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(c}(2)(B) (1980).

Id. § 1738A(c)(2)(C).
7' Id. § 1738A(c)(2)(D).
71

Id. § 1738A(d). See text accompanying notes 102-105 infra.
Hearings, supra note 9,at 12 (statement of Senator Malcolm Wallop).
Id. at 144 (statement of Russell M. Coombs).
28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(a) (1980).
SI Some states adopting the UCCJA have varied the language of the statute that the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws prescribed. Hearings,supra.
note 9, at 144. Variations in UCCJA provisions may undercut the uniformity and consistency
necessary for states to give equal treatment to interstate enforcement and jurisdiction
questions. I&; see, e.g., MD. CHANCERY ANN. CODE art. 16 § 188(a) (1981) (deviating from
UCCJA emergency jurisdiction language); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 600, 656 (1981) (extending greater deference to sister states' exercises of custody jurisdiction).
" State courts occasionally have interpreted the basic provisions of the UCCJA inconsistently. Hearings,supra note 9, at 144 (statement of Russell M. Coombs). Compare Gaines
v. Gaines, 566 S.W.2d 814, 817-18 (Ky. 1978) (exercise of custody jurisdiction was erroneous)
with Williams v. Zacher, 35 Or. App. 129. -,
581 P.2d 91, 96 (1978) (failure to assume
custody jurisdiction held improper).
71 See
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in the courts of other states."3 Thus, Congress was acting within the
bounds of its constitutional mandate when it defined the effects of child
custody decrees. 4 To the extent that the Supreme Court's reluctance to
extend full faith and credit to child custody decrees reflects a desire to
defer policy considerations to Congress8 5 the Court probably would
uphold Congress' exercise of this authority. 6
The PKPA involves the federal government in the field of child
custody in only a minimal way. The statute avoids imposing criteria on
the states for use in making custody determinations. 7 Rather, the PKPA
merely requires recognition in sister states of custody decrees meeting
the prescribed jurisdictional prerequisites. The statute thus allows

U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; see ParentalKidnapping PreventionAct of 1979: Addendum to Joint Hearings on S.105 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Child and Human Development of the
Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 267 (1980) (statement
of Russell M. Coombs). See also Hearings, supra note 9, at 140 (statement of Wallace
Mlyniec and Nancy Lyn Hiestand).
" See Ratner, Child Custody in a Federal System, 62 MICH. L. REV. 795, 827 n.153
(1964).

See note 46 supra.

One potential constitutional question the Court may have to address is whether the
congressional requirement of full faith and credit has the capacity to preempt state custody
law. In order for a federal statute to supersede state law, Congress must express a "clear
and manifest" purpose that the legislation do so. Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S.
218, 230 (1947). Congress may evidence intent to preclude state initiative in several ways.
The pervasiveness of the statute may indicate the desire that the act operate exclusive of
state law. Id. The national interest in the subject may be so strong that the federal law
predominates over the state legislation. Id. The federal policy also may conflict with state
policy to such an extent that the federal statute prevails over state law. Id. See generally
H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 435 (1953) [hereinafter cited
as WECHSLER]; Hart, The Relations Between State and FederalLaw, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489
(1954).
In view of the inherent recognition in the PKPA that states should continue to exercise custody jurisdiction and render custody decisions, Congress did not intend for the
federal statute to preempt substantive state custody law. Hearings,supra note 9, at 146-47
(statement of Russell M. Coombs). The federal statute specifically refers to the continued
role of the states in determining child custody. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1738A (1980). The PKPA is not
an all-encompassing law, but merely an enforcement mechanism for state law. Hearings,
supra note 9, at 146-47 (statement of Russell M. Coombs). Although the federal law provides
procedures for interstate enforcement of custody ecrees, the statute defers to the states to
continue to determine substantive child custody policy. Id. Congress intended the state and
federal governments to work in tandem to reduce the number of child abductions. Id. at 15
(statement of Senator Malcolm Wallop).
Federal legislation is often intersticial in character, filling in gaps and supplementing
state law. WECHSLER, supra, at 435. Congress designed the PKPA merely to aid the states
in receiving recognition of their custody decrees by closing the doors to the remaining
haven states that have failed to enact the UCCJA. See Hearings,supra note 9, at 15 (statement of Senator Malcolm Wallop).
' Hearings, supra note 9, at 140 (statement of Wallace Mlyniec and Nancy Lyn Hiestand).
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states to maintain their traditional role in defining substantive child
custody issues."

One possibility that may remain under both the UCCJA and PKPA
for escaping interstate custody recognition is the one the Supreme
Court left open in May v. Anderson." The unwillingness of the May
Court to require full faith and credit for custody decrees rendered
without jurisdiction over both parents may provide a basis for courts to
refuse custody recognition. Because neither statute requires the
presence of both parents for child custody adjudication," the legislation
may be subject to attack on the ground that the acts violate fourteenth
amendment due process protections. 1 Support for a personal jurisdiction
challenge is also available in Kulko v. Superior Court.92 In Kulko, the
Court held that a forum state must have personal jurisdiction over an individual to enforce a child support judgment against him, even though
the forum is the domicile of the child and the custodial parent.2 If the
Court maintains its May and Kulko positions, a successful jurisdictional
challenge may offer one avenue for circumventing the federal and state
legislation.
Several reasons suggest why the Court may not adhere to its May
and Kulko positions in applying the new legislation. Although the Court
in May refused to make full faith and credit mandatory for custody
decrees rendered without personal jurisdiction over both parents," the
Court implied that states could uphold foreign-state decrees on the basis
of comity. 5 The Court may distinguish Kulko because the case involved
enforcement of a money judgment, not determination of status, which is
at issue in custody cases. 8 The Supreme Court has suggested the need
for an exception to the personal jurisdiction requirement for status
" Id. While the federal statute allows states to retain control over custody decisions,
the PKPA does represent a policy determination that permanent custody decrees serve the
best interest of children by promoting a stable home environment. PARENTAL KIDNAPPING
PREVENTION ACT, Pub. L. No. 96-611 § 7(c)(5), 94 Stat. 3568 (1980) (legislative purposes).
9, See text accompanying notes 23-25 supra.
The preferred "home state" jurisdiction under the. UCCJA requires that the child
and only one parent must be present within the state for the prescribed time period.
UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT § 2(5). Likewise, the jurisdictional definition of
"home state" in the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act recognizes custody adjudications
when only one parent is present within the state. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(b)(4) (1980).
" The due process clause provides that states must follow proper judicial procedures
to safeguard the interests of the parties. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
12436 U.S. 84 (1978).
" Id at 91-92.
4 345 U.S. 528, 534 (1953).

Id. at 535 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
The UCCJA treats child custody cases as status proceedings, similar to divorce and
adoption cases. See Bodenheimer & Neeley-Kvarme, JurisdictionOver Child Custody and
Adoption After Shaffer and Kulko, 12 U. CAL. D.L. REV. 229, 246 (1979) [hereinafter cited as

Bodenheimer & Neeley-Kvarme].
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determinations.97 Moreover, the stringent notice requirement incorporated in the legislation should satisfy the fundamental concerns of due
process, sufficient notice, and opportunity to be heard.9"
Several state cases have presented the due process question in-the
context of the UCCJA,99 but the problem also may confront the PKPA.'1
At present, courts that believe the UCCJA satisfies due process despite
the Act's failure to require personal jurisdiction over both parents appear to be prevailing. 10' How courts resolve the conflict between mandatory recognition of custody decrees and lack of personal jurisdiction
over both parents may determine the ultimate success of the combined
federal and state efforts.
Another area of potential controversy is the conflict between the
continuing jurisdiction provision included in both the federal and state
acts. Both statutes attempt to limit custody jurisdiction by allowing the
original forum state to continue to exercise jurisdiction after the initial
decree." 2 The two acts differ, however, in whose law decides whether
the original forum retains jurisdiction. Under the UCCJA the second
state looks to its own laws to determine whether to defer to the first
forum's exercise of jurisdiction. 0° By contrast, under the PKPA the second forum must examine the laws of the first forum as well as the provisions of the federal statute to decide whether to assume jurisdiction." 4
In reviewing the jurisdictional question, a court in a UCCJA state now

Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 208 n.30 (1977).
' See Bodenheimer & Neeley-Kvarme, supra note 96, at 239-40.
" Most courts reject the due process challenge to the UCCJA. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Leonard, 122 Cal. App. 3d 443, 458, 175 Cal. Rptr. 903, 911 (Ct. App. 1981)
(upholding UCCJA despite lack of personal jurisdiction); Goldfarb v. Goldfarb, 246 Ga. 24,
27-28, 268 S.E.2d 648, 651 (1980) (supporting UCCJA against personal jurisdiction attack);
Yearta v. Scroggins, 245 Ga. 831, 832, 268 S.E.2d 151, 153 (1980) (extending comity recognition to custody decree despite failure to meet full faith and credit personal jurisdiction requirement). At least one state, however, has held that the UCCJA failure to insist on per406
sonal jurisdiction violates due process. Pasqualone v. Pasqualone, 63 Ohio St. 96, -,
N.E.2d 1121, 1126-27 (1980).
" The court in In re Marriage of Leonard indicated that, although the PKPA was not
applicable to the-case, the court considered the due process issues presented by the PKPA
and the UCCJA to be essentially the same. 122 Cal. App. 3d 443, 460 n.10, 175 Cal. Rptr.
903, 912 n.10 (Cal. App. 1981). The court suggested that personal jurisdiction is not
necessary to merit the benefits of full faith and credit. Id. (dicta).
' See note 99 supra.
" UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT § 14; 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(f) (1980).
' To determine whether a state may modify another state's prior custody decree, the
UCCJA provides that the second forum must conclude according to its own standards that
the first forum no longer retains jurisdiction. UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT §
14.
10' Under the PKPA, a state may not modify a sister state's initial custody decree
unless the second state can demonstrate that it has sufficient jurisdiction and that the first
state no longer retains or has declined to exercise jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738(A)(f)
(1980).
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must consider the laws of both the first forum and the second forum
before its assump1tion of jurisdiction merits universal recognition."'
The nearly complete adoption of the UCCJA coupled with the passage of the PKPA should curtail significantly parental attempts to circumvent existing custody decrees. Whether obtained through full faith
and credit or comity, interstate recognition of custody rulings will
undercut the incentive for non-custodial parents to use self-help to evade
custody determinations. Although experience with the legislation remains, the combined impact of the state and federal statutes should
deter parental kidnapping, dissuade forum shopping, reduce interstate
jurisdictional competition, and promote more stable home environments.
GAINES H. CLEVELAND

105 The court in Fowler v. Fowler applied both the UCCJA and the PKPA to hold that
New York could modify a prior California custody decree. 7 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2679 (N.Y.
Fain. Ct. 1981). The court examined both the laws of California, the original forum, and New
York, the modifying state, to determine whether California retained jurisdiction. Id Both
the PKPA and the UCCJA provide that before a state may modify a sister state's prior
custody decree, the second state must establish its own right to exercise jurisdiction over
the case. See notes 103-104 supra.

